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INTRODUCTION
At first blush, major state universities and colleges appear to be
well-balanced with their private counterparts: Each contains strong
academic programs with Nobel Laureates and other notable scholars
in their research labs and lecture halls; each fields large numbers of
strong sports teams; and each benefits from the current federal intellectual property rights regime, whereby valuable patents, copyrights,
and trademarks have been claimed. Despite this apparent parity,
however, state universities have a surprising economic advantage over
private universities—state universities can profit from their Eleventh
Amendment immunity against damage claims for intellectual property
infringement. Private institutions are not similarly immune.
This disparate treatment of intellectual property rights is particularly important because of several recent cases involving universities
(both public and private) against private entities. Two noteworthy examples include litigation by the University of Rochester against G.D.
Searle & Co. (Pharmacia) for the alleged infringement of the Univer1
sity’s patent on the Cox-2 enzyme and John Madey’s claim against
Duke University concerning the alleged infringement of his patents
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on laboratory equipment. Since the universities in both of these
cases are private entities, neither case involved sovereign immunity.
However, had either school been a state university, the cases would
have involved an additional layer of complexity.
Since the early 1990s, there have been numerous congressional attempts to remedy the imbalances caused by the Eleventh Amend3
ment’s sovereign immunity. Of these, two laws were found unconsti4
tutional by the Supreme Court, and several other proposals have died
on the congressional floor. Undaunted, Senator Patrick Leahy of
Vermont has submitted a bill, the Intellectual Property Protection
5
Restoration Act of 2003, to rectify the unfairness of the existing doctrine of sovereign immunity as applied to the federal intellectual
property rights regime. Although it has undergone significant altera6
tions since it was initially proposed in 1999, the Intellectual Property
Protection Restoration Act should be supported and adopted by all
those concerned with intellectual property rights.
In this Comment, I argue that the tightening of permitted behavior under the intellectual property statutes, when coupled with the
current incentives and priorities of universities, requires a change to
the state universities’ immunity from damages in infringement cases.
Part I briefly summarizes the relationship between universities and intellectual property rights. Historically, both public and private universities understood that they were subject to the same set of intellectual

2

Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 2639
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3
See infra text accompanying notes 54, 80, 90 (discussing, respectively, the Indian
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property laws, including monetary damages for infringement. Part II
reviews the development and evolution of state sovereign immunity
case law, with particular emphasis on cases involving intellectual
property. The lesson from recent cases is that state universities are
unequivocally immune from intellectual property damage remedies.
The importance of state university immunity is considered in Part III,
which presents several reasons why such immunity is not appropriate.
Part IV discusses possible solutions, including Senator Leahy’s proposal, which are currently being debated by legislators and vetted by
scholars. Finally, Part V analyzes and recommends the adoption of
Senator Leahy’s bill and explains why state universities and other interested parties should support it.
I. UNIVERSITIES AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
“A university should be a place of light, of liberty, and of learn7
ing.” These words, spoken by Benjamin Disraeli to the House of
Commons in 1873, continue to resonate today. American universities—both public and private—are the sanctuaries of great minds, innovative ideas, and intellectual opportunity.
It is unsurprising, then, that universities have parlayed these
strengths into intellectual property rights and economic benefits.
Current data suggests that universities hold over 22,500 patents, with
8
13,000 of these held by public universities and colleges. The United
States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) has calculated that at
least 2.5% of all issued utility patents are currently owned by state aca9
demic institutions. Furthermore, four-year state colleges and universities have registered over 32,000 monographs with the United States
10
Copyright Office since 1978, and it has also been estimated that they

7

Benjamin Disraeli, Address to the House of Commons (Mar. 11, 1873), quoted in
JOHN BARTLETT, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 502 (Emily Morison Beck ed., 15th ed. 1980).
8
State Sovereign Immunity and Protection of Intellection Property: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts & Intellectual Prop. of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 9
(2000) [hereinafter Hearing on State Sovereign Immunity] (statement of Todd Dickinson,
Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property; Director, United States Patent
and Trademark Office) (providing the results of the USPTO’s empirical research into
state ownership of intellectual property).
9
Id. at 9 (statement of Todd Dickinson, Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property; Director, United States Patent and Trademark Office).
10
Id. at 15 (statement of Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights, U.S. Copyright
Office) (noting the number of copyrights registered by four-year public colleges and
universities).
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own over 2700 trademarks. The monetary value of this intellectual
property is realized through licensing and technology transfer arrangements, whereby a university licenses its intellectual property to
another entity. In fiscal year 2002, according to the Association of
University Technology Managers, public and private universities received almost one billion dollars in gross license income from their
12
intellectual property.
Such lucrative licensing opportunities illustrate the increasing importance and utility of university research to private enterprise that
13
14
the Bayh-Dole Act was meant to foster. As a result of the Act, public-private collaborations have developed and commercialized novel
technologies like enhanced cellular voice quality and improved com15
modity products such as cleaner electricity. Indeed, in this cooperative environment, it was rare for patent infringement suits to be
brought against academic institutions, since most technologies were
made available to academic researchers under reasonable terms—e.g.,
16
at low cost and with acceptable restrictions on use.
Another reason that such suits were few and far between was
the parity between universities and commercial patent-holders with
regard to damage remedies in infringement suits. As described by the

11

U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: STATE IMMUNITY IN
INFRINGEMENT ACTIONS 43-44 app.II at tbl.4 (2001).
12
ASS’N OF UNIV. TECH. MANAGERS, AUTM LICENSING SURVEY: FY 2002, at 62
(2003), available at http://www.autm.net.
13
Act of Dec. 12, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015 (codified as amended at
17 U.S.C. § 117 (2000), 35 U.S.C. §§ 41–42, 200–211, 301–307 (2000)) (commonly referred to as the Bayh-Dole Act).
14
The Bayh-Dole Act encourages entities receiving federal funds to obtain patents
for their inventions. Since its passage, there has been a dramatic increase in the number of patents pursued by universities. Although a fuller discussion of the Bayh-Dole
Act is beyond the scope of this Comment, a robust explanation and overview of the Act
and its impact may be found in Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Public Research and Private Development: Patents and Technology Transfer in Government-Sponsored Research, 82 VA. L. REV.
1663 (1996).
15
See ASS’N OF UNIV. TECH. MANAGERS, supra note 12, at 4-5 (describing the new
technology for improved sound capture and noise reduction in cell phones, hearing
aids, and other electronic devices developed by Carnegie Mellon University, now licensed to Akustica Inc., and the invention of a new plasma electric generator to produce low-cost clean electricity by researchers at the University of California-Irvine and
University of Florida, now licensed to Tri Alpha Energy).
16
See Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1092, 1096 ( Jan. 5, 2001)
(commenting on the rarity of infringement suits by commercial patent owners against
academics because of the “favorable licensing terms”).
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USPTO, the Copyright Office, congressional investigators, and
20
even the National Association of College and University Attorneys,
everyone shared the belief that state universities (as well as other state
entities) were subject to intellectual property infringement suits and
remedies. The consequence was implicit but sweeping: All intellectual property holders were assured the protection of their invention,
creation, or trademark against any possible infringer, including a state
university. It was widely understood that if a state entity infringed
upon a patent, copyright, or trademark, the holder could seek not
only injunctive but also monetary relief.
This bedrock of understanding was shaken to its core in 1999,
when the Supreme Court ended its decade-long erosion of private individuals’ rights against intellectual property infringement by state entities.
II. EVOLUTION OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY DOCTRINE
A. Common Law Development and Revolution
Understanding the historical development of sovereign immunity
is important to any analysis of the Supreme Court’s recent decisions
21
regarding state immunity in the intellectual property regime. The

17

Hearing on State Sovereign Immunity, supra note 8, at 10 (statement of Todd Dickinson, Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property; Director, United States
Patent and Trademark Office) (explaining that when Congress passed the Bayh-Dole
Act, the USPTO believed “that state instrumentalities were amenable to damage suits
for violation of intellectual property on the same terms as private actors”).
18
Id. at 16 (statement of Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyright, U.S. Copyright
Office) (testifying that “[f]or most of our history, it has been assumed that the States
enjoyed no special immunity from suits for infringement of intellectual property
rights”).
19
See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 11, at 24 (reporting that there
have not been many cases of past state infringement because “states previously were of
the opinion they could be sued for damages in federal court—a situation that no
longer exists”).
20
Nat’l Ass’n of Coll. & Univ. Attorneys, Critique of Objections to S. 2031, at 1, at
http://www.nacua.org/documents/2031responsetouniversities.pdf (last visited Apr.
30, 2004) (explaining that “[u]ntil recently, it was understood and accepted” that all
states were “liable for monetary relief for infringements of federally protected intellectual property”).
21
Numerous scholars have chronicled the colorful history of sovereign immunity
and its role in intellectual property. See generally Mitchell N. Berman et al., State Accountability for Violations of Intellectual Property Rights: How to “Fix” Florida Prepaid (And
How Not To), 79 TEX. L. REV. 1037, 1044-51 (2001); Christina Bohannan, Beyond Abrogation of Sovereign Immunity: State Waivers, Private Contracts, and Federal Incentives, 77 N.Y.U.
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Supreme Court’s decision in Chisholm v. Georgia was the impetus for
a constitutional amendment regarding the scope of state sovereign
immunity. In Chisholm, a South Carolina creditor brought suit against
23
the State of Georgia for repayment of debt. In its ruling for Chisholm,
the Court held that the Constitution provided the federal judiciary
with jurisdiction over all cases arising between a state and citizens of
24
another state. In response, Congress passed and the states ratified
the Eleventh Amendment, which restored sovereign immunity for the
25
states against out-of-state private litigants.
A century after adoption of the Eleventh Amendment, the Supreme Court heard its second seminal case concerning private suits
26
against a state. In Hans v. Louisiana, the plaintiff sued the State of
27
Louisiana for refusing to redeem his bond coupons. The plaintiff, a
citizen of Louisiana, contended that the Eleventh Amendment did not
apply because it only prevented suits based on diversity of citizenship,
28
not suits where the plaintiff was a citizen of the defendant state. The
Court rejected the plaintiff’s argument, holding that the Eleventh
29
Amendment prohibited all private suits against a state. Indeed, the
Court reached back further than the origins of the Eleventh Amendment to the early writings of Alexander Hamilton and other “great defenders of the Constitution” who criticized the idea of allowing a non30
consenting state to be sued by any individual. Following Hans, a state
was immune from private actions unless it consented to the suit.
Obtaining consent was made easier after Parden v. Terminal Rail31
way of Alabama State Docks Department, which acknowledged that there
could be implied waivers of sovereign immunity. In Parden, employees

L. REV. 273, 278-81 (2002); John T. Cross, Suing the States for Copyright Infringement, 39
BRANDEIS L.J. 337, 342-55 (2000); Steve Malin, The Protection of Intellectual-Property Rights
in a Federalist Era, 6 COMPUTER L. REV. & TECH. J. 137, 139-63 (2002).
22
2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
23
Id. at 429-30 (Iredell, J., dissenting).
24
Id. at 467-68 (Cushing, J.).
25
U.S. CONST. amend. XI. The Eleventh Amendment provides that “[t]he Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or
equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.” Id.
26
134 U.S. 1 (1890).
27
Id. at 2-8.
28
Id. at 6-7.
29
Id. at 15.
30
Id. at 12-14 (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 81 (Alexander Hamilton)); see also id. at
14 (discussing statements by James Madison and John Marshall).
31
377 U.S. 184 (1964).
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of the state-run railway brought suit under the Federal Employers’ Li32
ability Act (FELA) for damages caused by work-related personal in33
jury. The State of Alabama argued that it was immune from liability
34
under the Eleventh Amendment and rejected the employee claims.
After considering prior case law, including Hans, the Court ruled for
the employees, holding that the Commerce Clause implicitly waived
state sovereign immunity regarding the regulation of commerce. The
Court stated that “[b]y empowering Congress to regulate commerce . . . the States necessarily surrendered any portion of their sovereignty that would stand in the way of such regulation. . . . [I]t must
follow that application of [FELA] to such a railroad cannot be pre35
cluded by sovereign immunity.”
Parden’s impact on the sovereign immunity doctrine was relatively
short-lived, however, because it was overruled by the Supreme Court
36
in 1985. In Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, the Court held that
37
implied waivers of state immunity would not be recognized. Plaintiff
Scanlon brought the suit for monetary damages under section 504 of
38
the Rehabilitation Act, but the California state hospital argued that it
39
was immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment. The Court
agreed with the hospital, holding that the Rehabilitation Act did not
40
abrogate California’s Eleventh Amendment immunity. According to
the Court, a state may only waive its immunity by making an “unequivocal indication that the State intends to consent to federal jurisdiction that would otherwise be barred by the Eleventh Amend41
ment.” Likewise, Congress may only abrogate state immunity if it
provides an “unequivocal expression of congressional intent to ‘over42
turn the constitutionally guaranteed immunity of the several States.’”

32

45 U.S.C. §§ 51–60 (2000).
Parden, 377 U.S. at 184-85.
34
See id. at 186 (“Respondents rely, as did the lower courts in dismissing the action, on sovereign immunity . . . .”).
35
Id. at 192.
36
473 U.S. 234 (1985).
37
See id. at 238-40 (stating that although there are limits to sovereign immunity, a
state’s waiver of immunity will only be recognized when expressly made).
38
29 U.S.C. § 794 (2000).
39
Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 236.
40
Id. at 246.
41
Id. at 238 n.1.
42
Id. at 240 (quoting Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 99
(1984)); see also Welch v. Tex. Dep’t of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 478
(1987) (“Accordingly, to the extent that Parden . . . is inconsistent with the requirement
33
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The result of Atascadero, then, was to eviscerate the implied waiver
theory and to establish a clear test for determining when immunity
has been waived.
Four years after Atascadero, the Court once again delivered a holding that would later be overturned in subsequent years. In Pennsylva43
nia v. Union Gas Co., the Supreme Court was presented with a thirdparty complaint by Union Gas against the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensa44
tion, and Liability Act (CERCLA) for shared liability for hazardous
45
waste clean-up costs. Pennsylvania denied liability, claiming that it
46
was immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment. This argument was adopted by both the district and circuit courts, which found
no clear expression of congressional intent to waive sovereign immu47
nity. The Supreme Court disagreed, however, and held that Penn48
sylvania was liable for sharing the cost of the clean up. In its analysis,
the Court first looked for, and found, clear intent by Congress in
49
CERCLA to abrogate state sovereign immunity for damage claims.
In the second half of its analysis, the Court upheld Congress’s author50
ity to abrogate state immunity under its Commerce Clause powers.
51
This latter finding was buttressed by referring to Parden and analogizing Congress’s right to abrogate immunity under the Fourteenth
52
Amendment with its ability to do so under the Commerce Clause.
Consequently, the result was that Congress could abrogate immunity
under its Article I powers.

that an abrogation of Eleventh Amendment immunity by Congress must be expressed
in unmistakably clear language, it is overruled.”).
43
491 U.S. 1 (1989).
44
42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675 (2000).
45
Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. at 6.
46
Id.
47
See id. (citing the lower courts’ holdings in United States v. Union Gas Co., 832
F.2d 1343 (3d Cir. 1987), and United States v. Union Gas Co., 575 F. Supp. 949 (E.D. Pa.
1983), that Union Gas’s suit was barred under the Eleventh Amendment).
48
Id. at 23.
49
See id. at 7-13 (holding that “CERCLA clearly permits suits for money damages
against States in federal court”).
50
Id. at 14-19.
51
Id. at 14.
52
See id. at 16-17 (noting that, “[l]ike the Fourteenth Amendment, the Commerce
Clause with one hand gives power to Congress while, with the other, it takes power
away from the States”).
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Mirroring the reversal seen in both Parden and Atascadero, Union Gas
53
was soon overruled by the Supreme Court in Seminole Tribe v. Florida.
There, the Court decided whether the Indian Commerce Clause, under Article I of the Constitution, provided Congress with authority to
54
abrogate state immunity in the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act. The
Court overruled its decision in Union Gas, holding that Congress
could not rely on its Article I powers to abrogate state immunity, even
55
with a clearly expressed intent to do so. Following this decision, the
only remaining authority for congressional abrogation of state immu56
nity lay within Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
57
As several commentators have noted, Congress’s power to abrogate immunity under even the Fourteenth Amendment was brought
into question after the Supreme Court’s decision in City of Boerne v.
58
This case concerned the constitutionality of the Religious
Flores.
59
Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), which required states to make
specific findings before adopting laws that “substantially burden” an
60
individual’s religious practices. Although the case did not deal with
state immunity per se, the Court ruled that Congress could only use
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment as a “‘remedial’” power for
61
enforcing that Amendment’s provisions. The Court established a
test for determining when this remedial power is properly used, holding that “[t]here must be a congruence and proportionality between
the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that
62
end.” Considering the RFRA, the Court concluded that the statute

53

517 U.S. 44 (1996).
25 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2721 (2000).
55
Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 66 (“We feel bound to conclude that Union Gas was
wrongly decided and that it should be, and now is, overruled.”).
56
Id. at 59 (referring to the Court’s holding in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445,
452-56 (1976), which recognized the Fourteenth Amendment as a source of authority
to abrogate state immunity); see also Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. 1972
(2003) (holding that the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 5 U.S.C. §§ 6381–6387
(2000), 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2654 (2000), validly abrogated state sovereign immunity
under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment).
57
See, e.g., Malin, supra note 21, at 154 (classifying the City of Boerne decision as “a
serious blow” to “Congress’s power to legislate under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment”).
58
521 U.S. 507 (1997).
59
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (2000).
60
521 U.S. at 515.
61
Id. at 519 (quoting South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 326 (1966)).
62
Id. at 520.
54
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lacked these characteristics and thus was unconstitutional under the
63
Fourteenth Amendment.
Most recently, the test articulated in City of Boerne was applied and
found to be satisfied by the Court in Nevada Department of Human Re64
sources v. Hibbs. In Hibbs, the Court determined that when enacting
the family-leave provision of the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993
65
(FMLA), Congress had properly abrogated the State’s sovereign immunity through a valid exercise of its power under Section 5 of the
66
Fourteenth Amendment. Under the FMLA, employees may “seek
both equitable relief and money damages ‘against any employer (including a public agency) in any Federal or State court of competent
jurisdiction’ . . . should that employer ‘interfere with, restrain, or deny
67
the exercise of’ FMLA rights.” The Court concluded that Congress
had sufficient evidence to conclude that state laws and policies regard68
ing family leave “were applied in discriminatory ways” and that states
had been participating in “gender-based discrimination in the admini69
stration of leave benefits.” Because gender-based differentiation is
subject to heightened scrutiny, the Court found that Congress was jus70
tified in passing “prophylactic § 5 legislation” and that such legisla71
tion was “congruent and proportional to its remedial object.”
Finally, in 1999, the Supreme Court articulated the last three
principles of its modern sovereign immunity jurisprudence. The first
principle concerned the question whether the Eleventh Amendment
barred suits against the state in both federal and state courts. In Alden
72
v. Maine, the Court responded in the affirmative. There, a group of
probation officers brought an action against the State of Maine for al73
leged violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). The case
had been dismissed by lower courts—both federal and state—because

63

Id. at 532-33.
123 S. Ct. 1972, 1982-84 (2003).
65
5 U.S.C. §§ 6381–6387 (2000), 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2654 (2000).
66
See Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. at 1984 (concluding that the Family and Medical Leave Act
“is congruent and proportional to its remedial object[ive], and can ‘be understood as
responsive to or designed to prevent, unconstitutional behavior’” (quoting City of
Boerne, 521 U.S. at 532)).
67
Id. at 1976 (quoting 29 U.S.C. §§ 2617(a)(2), 2615(a)(1) (2000)).
68
Id. at 1980.
69
Id. at 1981.
70
Id. at 1979.
71
Id. at 1984.
72
527 U.S. 706 (1999).
73
29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219 (2000).
64
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of Maine’s right to immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. Refusing to accept the Petitioner’s arguments to the contrary, the Court
held that “[i]n light of history, practice, precedent, and the structure
of the Constitution, we hold that the States retain immunity from private suit in their own courts, an immunity beyond the congressional
75
power to abrogate by Article I legislation.”
The second and third principles of the Court’s modern jurisprudence were established in two companion cases: Florida Prepaid Post76
secondary Education Expense Board v. College Savings Bank and College
77
Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board.
Each case concerned a tuition savings plan marketed by College Savings Bank, a New Jersey bank, for financing the costs of higher educa78
tion. In its original suit against Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board, a state agency that administered prepayment
tuition programs for Florida’s public colleges and universities, the
Bank alleged that the Board infringed its patent on the savings plan’s
financial methodology and made misstatements concerning its own
79
savings plan. The two issues were split on appeal, but the Supreme
Court published both opinions on the same day.
In Florida Prepaid, the Court addressed the constitutionality of the
Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act
80
(PRCA). Passed in 1992, the PRCA responded to Atascadero and re81
lated lower federal court decisions by including an unequivocal ex82
pression of Congress’s intent to abrogate immunity. Despite finding
that Congress clearly intended to abrogate immunity for intellectual
83
property infringement, the Court held in Florida Prepaid that the
PRCA did not satisfy the requirements established in City of Boerne and
74

Alden, 527 U.S. at 712.
Id. at 754.
76
527 U.S. 627 (1999).
77
527 U.S. 666 (1999).
78
College Savings Bank, 527 U.S. at 670-71; Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 630.
79
College Savings Bank, 527 U.S. at 671; Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 631.
80
7 U.S.C. §§ 2541(a)–(b), 2570 (2000), 35 U.S.C. §§ 271(h), 296 (2000).
81
See, e.g., BV Eng’g v. Univ. of Cal., 858 F.2d 1394, 1400 (9th Cir. 1988) (relying
on Atascadero to determine that Congress did not intend to hold nonconsenting states
liable in federal court for damages under the Copyright Act); Kersavage v. Univ. of
Tenn., 731 F. Supp. 1327, 1330 (E.D. Tenn. 1989) (holding that a state university was
immune from damages for patent infringement).
82
Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 635 (“[I]n enacting the Patent Remedy Act, Congress
has made its intention to abrogate the States’ immunity ‘unmistakably clear in the language of the statute.’” (quoting Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 228 (1989))).
83
Id.
75
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thus was unconstitutional. First, the Court noted that the legislative
record did not hold evidence of “a history of ‘widespread and persisting deprivation of constitutional rights’ of the sort Congress has faced
85
in enacting proper prophylactic Section 5 legislation.” Second, the
provisions of the PRCA were deemed disproportionate to any behav86
ior that Congress was trying to prevent. In summary, the second
principle in our modern jurisprudence is the stringent proportionality
test set forth in City of Boerne and Florida Prepaid to abrogate a state’s
Eleventh Amendment immunity.
The companion case, College Savings Bank, established the third
principle of the Court’s modern sovereign immunity jurisprudence.
College Savings Bank signaled the death of the constructive waiver the87
ory established in Parden. Predicated on two assumptions, the constructive waiver theory required that, first, Congress unambiguously
provide that a state will be stripped of its immunity if it engages in
specific, federally regulated conduct and, second, that the state volun88
tarily elects to engage in such conduct. The Court in College Savings
89
Bank was not impressed with this theory and rejected it. Ultimately,
the Court dismissed the Bank’s Lanham Act suit for alleged misstatements because it concluded that the Trademark Remedy Clarification
90
Act (TRCA), like the PRCA, did not validly abrogate Florida’s im91
munity, nor had Florida voluntarily waived its immunity.
While not uncontroversial, scholars’ present understanding of
Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence is accurately summarized by
Professors Mitchell Berman, Anthony Reese, and Ernest Young.
They contend that the Court has deviated from the constitutional text
by rewriting the Amendment to reflect the following principles:
(1) that “state sovereign immunity bars suits based on federal question
84

Id. at 639, 646-48.
Id. at 645 (quoting City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 526). It is important to keep in
mind that at the time of these congressional findings, the conventional understanding among the States was that they were not immune from infringement damages. See
supra notes 17-20 (describing the widely held belief that states were subject to damage
claims for intellectual property rights infringement). This might explain the lack of
any “widespread” deprivation of rights.
86
Id. at 646.
87
527 U.S. at 680 (stating that the “constructive-waiver experiment of Parden was
ill conceived” and that there was “no merit in attempting to salvage any remnant of
it”).
88
Id. at 679.
89
See supra note 87.
90
15 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1122, 1125, 1127 (2000).
91
College Savings Bank, 527 U.S. at 691.
85
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92

jurisdiction as well as on diversity jurisdiction,” (2) that “state sovereign immunity operates as a federal constitutional bar to jurisdiction
93
even where the suit is brought in state court,” and (3) that “state sovereign immunity can be waived by the state governmental defen94
dant.” Professors Berman, Reese, and Young further assert that the
Court’s present majority “views state sovereign immunity as a preconstitutional principle, implicit in the constitutional structure, that
95
bars suits against states for money damages.”
B. The Fallout from Florida Prepaid and College Savings Bank
It is difficult to understate the impact of Florida Prepaid and College
Savings Bank. Since 1999, cases against state universities have been
overturned or dismissed, intellectual property holders have behaved
strategically, and some courts have engaged in judicial activism.
In light of these decisions, two intellectual property infringement
cases against state universities were vacated and eventually dismissed.
96
The first case, Genentech v. Regents of the University of California, involved a declaratory judgment action by Genentech, a biopharmaceu97
tical company, against the University of California. Genentech asked
the court to declare a University-owned patent invalid and unenforceable and, in the alternative, to declare that Genentech’s own patent
98
did not infringe on the University’s. On appeal, the Federal Circuit
ruled that because the University chose to “enter the federal arena,”
had “sole control and initiative” leading up to the dispute, and “invoke[d] . . . federal law and federal judicial power for enforcement of
99
federal property rights,” it had waived its immunity. The Supreme
Court disagreed, vacating and remanding the case for reconsideration
100
under College Savings Bank. Eventually, the case was settled and dis101
missed in an unpublished opinion by the Federal Circuit.
92

Berman et al., supra note 21, at 1047.
Id.
94
Id.
95
Id. at 1046.
96
143 F.3d 1446 (Fed. Cir. 1998), vacated and remanded, 527 U.S. 1031 (1999).
The parties voluntarily dismissed the suit on remand. Genentech v. Regents of the
Univ. of Cal., 230 F.3d 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (unpublished table decision).
97
Genentech, 143 F.3d at 1449.
98
Id.
99
Id. at 1453.
100
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Genentech, 527 U.S. 1031 (1999).
101
Genentech v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 230 F.3d 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (unpublished table decision).
93
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A second case of state intellectual property infringement was likewise vacated and remanded following Florida Prepaid and College Sav102
ings Bank. In Chavez v. Arte Publico Press, the Fifth Circuit assessed a
103
copyright infringement claim against the University of Houston. Re104
lying on the Copyright Remedy Clarification Act (CRCA), passed by
Congress in 1990 to expressly hold state entities accountable for
monetary damages in intellectual property infringement suits, Chavez
argued that the University was liable for publishing her manuscript
105
without consent. Reflecting on the recent holding in Florida Prepaid,
the Fifth Circuit evaluated three aspects of the CRCA to determine
whether it satisfied the requirements to abrogate state sovereign immunity: “1) the nature of the injury to be remedied; 2) Congress’s
consideration of the adequacy of state remedies to redress the injury;
106
and 3) the coverage of the legislation.” The Court found that there
was an insufficient legislative record of widespread copyright in107
fringement by the states.
Additionally, the Court determined that
Congress had failed to consider the availability of state remedies for
108
Finally, the Court noted that Congress
copyright infringement.
109
failed to properly limit the scope of the statute. Thus, in holding for
the University, the Fifth Circuit invalidated the most recent law to cre110
ate state accountability for intellectual property infringement.
Florida Prepaid and College Savings Bank have also created a deep
schism in the array of remedies available to individual plaintiffs
against states in intellectual property infringement cases. As the Register of Copyrights testified to Congress last June, “[t]he effect of the
Court’s 1999 decisions is that copyright owners are unable to obtain
monetary relief under the Copyright Act against a State, state entity,
111
or state employee unless the State waives its immunity.” The same is
112
true for patent and trademark infringement.

102

204 F.3d 601, 603 (5th Cir. 2000).
Id. at 603.
104
Pub. L. No. 101-553, 104 Stat. 2749 (1990) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C.
§§ 501, 511 (2000)).
105
Chavez, 204 F.3d at 603.
106
Id. at 605.
107
Id. at 605-06.
108
Id. at 606.
109
Id. at 607.
110
Id. at 608.
111
Intellectual Property Protection Restoration Act of 2003: Hearing on H.R. 2344 Before
the House Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Prop. of the Comm. on the Judiciary,
103
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As an example of the impact of the diminished remedies, consider
the story of Marc Andelman, an amateur inventor who developed a
113
novel method of purifying water. After obtaining a patent on his invention, he learned that the Department of Energy’s Lawrence
Livermore National Laboratory was publishing work on a similar
114
When Andelman confronted the lab, he learned that
technique.
because it had contracted with the University of California on a joint
venture, Livermore and its employees enjoyed the same sovereign
115
While Andelman could pursue a
immunity as the state university.
claim for injunctive relief, he would be prohibited from obtaining
116
monetary damages.
In response to these limited remedies, some intellectual property
holders may choose to engage in strategic behavior rather than risk
being shut out of monetary compensation for infringement alto117
gether.
As Professor Robert Bone has noted, sovereign immunity
may lead to strategic choices such as avoiding state universities in fa118
119
Alvor of private institutions and maintaining increased secrecy.
most any strategic behavior may “generate costs of [its] own, even
120
though [it] keep[s] the incidence of actual infringement in check.”

108th Cong. 10 (2003) [hereinafter Hearing on H.R. 2344 ] (statement of Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights, U.S. Copyright Office) (footnote omitted).
112
See infra Part IV (discussing legislative attempts to create incentives for states to
waive immunity in all areas of intellectual property law).
113
See David Wolman & Heather Wax, Putting the Squeeze on State Immunity: Are
States Abusing Their Immunity from Intellectual Property Laws?, TECH. REV. (Aug. 21, 2002)
(stating that Andelman “spent 11 years developing a new method for water purification using charged material to remove contaminants from dirty water” (citation omitted)), at http://www.technologyreview.com/articles/print_version/wolman08102.asp.
114
Id.
115
Id.
116
A broader discussion of alternative remedies for state intellectual infringement
will be presented in Part IV. For present purposes, it is important to highlight that the
immunity recognized by the Supreme Court is immunity against damages relief and
that there is no immunity from injunctive relief. Infra text accompanying notes 160-62.
117
See Robert G. Bone, From Property to Contract: The Eleventh Amendment and University-Private Sector Intellectual Property Relationships, 33 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1467, 1499
(2000) (arguing that the “simple story” regarding Eleventh Amendment immunity is
incomplete because “it ignores the strategic dimension of the interaction between state
universities and private parties”).
118
Id. at 1504-05 (suggesting that some intellectual property holders may choose
to shun state universities and work only with private universities, but later stating that
such extreme exclusivity is unlikely because opportunities at the former “are simply too
lucrative”).
119
Id. at 1505.
120
Id. at 1499.
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The outcome, as Bone suggests, is that “there might be little in121
fringement, yet greater inefficiency in the creative process.”
The final impact of the Florida Prepaid and College Savings Bank
cases is manifested in the apparent judicial activism occurring in several district courts. While claiming to adhere to the standard set forth
in Florida Prepaid and College Savings Bank, federal district courts in
California and Ohio have rejected claims of Eleventh Amendment
immunity for state universities in intellectual property infringement
122
cases. In both cases, the court reasoned that the university’s acquisi123
tion of intellectual property, which the court held constituted a “gift
124
or gratuity” from the federal government, was sufficient to waive
125
immunity.
Such decisions are not without critics. Professor John
Cross concluded that the district court in New Star Laser “seriously mis126
read the Supreme Court precedent” by failing to recognize that any
Congressional attempt to waive state immunity must be made “‘unambiguously,’ so as to ‘enable the States to exercise their choice know127
Notwithstanding this criticism, such rulings suggest that
ingly.’”
some courts will not tolerate state entities “tak[ing] the good without
the bad” by seeking to “enjoy all the benefits of a federal property or
128
right, while rejecting its limitations.”
III. CURRENT CONDITIONS MAKE IMMUNITY FOR
STATE UNIVERSITIES INAPPROPRIATE
Even if the presence of disgruntled intellectual property holders,
the threat of strategic behavior, and the potential for judicial activism are all adequate arguments against the Supreme Court’s current
121

Id.
See New Star Lasers, Inc. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 63 F. Supp. 2d 1240,
1244 (E.D. Cal. 1999) (denying the University’s motion to dismiss because it had
waived its immunity by engaging in the patent system); see also McGuire v. Regents of
the Univ. of Mich., No. 99-1231, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21615, at *12-13 (S.D. Ohio
Sept. 21, 2000) (relying on New Star Lasers to deny the University’s motion to dismiss
on sovereign immunity grounds).
123
McGuire, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21615, at *13 (infringing a trademark); New Star
Lasers, 63 F. Supp. 2d at 1241-42 (infringing a patent).
124
Both McGuire and New Star Lasers relied upon College Savings Bank for the
proposition that a “gift or gratuity” resulted in a waiver of immunity. McGuire, 2000
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21615, at *13; New Star Lasers, 63 F. Supp. 2d at 1244.
125
McGuire, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21615, at *13; New Star Lasers, 63 F. Supp. 2d at
1244.
126
Cross, supra note 21, at 363.
127
Id. (quoting South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987)).
128
New Star Lasers, 63 F. Supp. 2d at 1244.
122
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construction of Eleventh Amendment immunity, there are additional
reasons why its interpretation is not appropriate. As discussed in Part
I, universities have a history of acquiring intellectual property rights
129
and collaborating with private firms to commercialize such property.
But recent developments in the market and changes in the law have
altered the dynamics of this acquisition and commercialization in
such a way as to make state universities’ immunity from damage suits
for intellectual property infringement improper. These changes include the increasing financial importance of intellectual property for
state universities, a higher reliance on courts to enforce state universities’ intellectual property rights against infringement, and a tightening of the fair use and research exemptions.
Notwithstanding their nonprofit status, one should not begrudge
universities for trying to capitalize on a lucrative asset—their intellectual property. The commercial value of university-held patents, copyrights, and trademarks is enough to excite any university’s technology
130
transfer office. Interestingly, intellectual property is a relatively new
revenue generator for universities. Prior to the passage of the BayhDole Act in 1980, fewer than 250 patents per year were issued to uni131
132
The licensing of
versities. In 2002, that number exceeded 3000.
university-owned intellectual property has experienced a similarly remarkable increase. Between 1991 and 1999, universities’ “annual invention disclosures increased 63% (to 12,324), new patents filed increased 77% (to 5,545) and new licenses and options executed
133
Perhaps even more impressive is that
increased 129% (to 3,914).”
nearly $1 billion in gross revenue is received by universities annually
134
for licensing and transferring their intellectual property.
Multiple forces have driven this increasing emphasis on intellectual property as a revenue source for universities. Focusing on patents, Professor Rebecca Eisenberg has suggested that “[p]erhaps the
simplest explanation is that the Bayh-Dole Act gave universities a
129

See supra text accompanying notes 8-16 (describing the profitable nexus between universities and private industry in intellectual property matters).
130
See infra text accompanying note 134 (noting that the annual collective value of
university-owned intellectual property approaches one billion dollars).
131
Ass’n of Univ. Tech. Managers, Surveys—Common Questions & Answers About
Technology Transfer, at http://www.autm.net/pubs/survey/qa.html (last updated Nov.
13, 2000).
132
See ASS’N OF UNIV. TECH. MANAGERS, supra note 12, at 62 (reporting that 3109
U.S. patents were issued to universities in 2002).
133
Ass’n of Univ. Tech. Managers, supra note 131.
134
ASS’N OF UNIV. TECH. MANAGERS, supra note 12, at 62.
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revenue motive to pursue patent rights, and this revenue motive has
135
taken on a life of its own . . . .” She also has noted that although few
universities profited from their intellectual property rights as of 1996,
“many of them have great expectations, and they feel fully justified in
136
using their patent rights to bring in as much revenue as they can.”
In addition to the incentives provided by the Bayh-Dole Act, state
universities have other reasons for going commercial. As Professor
Peter Menell has articulated, there are at least three additional factors
that have encouraged state universities to exploit their intellectual
property assets: a decrease in state budget allocations for universities,
a decline in the growth rate of federal funding for tertiary educational
institutions, and a rising uncertainty about reliance upon all forms of
137
government funding. Driven by funding shortfalls, state universities
are motivated to exploit their intellectual property.
With exploitation, however, comes litigation. While the University
138
139
of Rochester and Duke University cases discussed in the Introduction highlight the general nature of the intellectual property infringement claims against universities, it is useful to consider the U.S.
General Accounting Office’s (GAO) comprehensive study of intellec140
tual property suits against state entities.
Generated for the Senate
Judiciary Committee, the GAO report evaluated state immunity in regard to intellectual property actions, paying particular attention to the
141
Although
consequences of Florida Prepaid and College Savings Bank.
142
there were several caveats to its findings, the GAO concluded that

135

Eisenberg, supra note 14, at 1722.
Id. at 1722-23.
137
Peter S. Menell, Economic Implications of State Sovereign Immunity from Infringement
of Federal Intellectual Property Rights, 33 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1399, 1434 (2000).
138
Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 249 F. Supp. 2d 216 (W.D.N.Y. 2003),
aff’d, 358 F.3d 916 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
139
Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct.
2639 (2003).
140
U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 11.
141
See id. at 1 (discussing Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. 627 (1999), and College Savings
Bank, 527 U.S. 666 (1999)).
142
Calculating the actual number of intellectual property cases involving a state
entity as a defendant is complicated for several reasons. First, some suits involving intellectual property infringement are brought under different causes-of-action. U.S.
GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 11, at 8. Second, identifying a state entity by
name is not a foolproof filter because some nonstate entities carry a state name in their
titles (e.g., California Institute of Technology, University of Pennsylvania), whereas legitimate state entities may not have the name of the state in their title (e.g., Auburn
University, Rutgers University). Id. Third, state officials are “more likely to handle an
136
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since 1985, there had been fifty-eight cases involving intellectual
143
property infringement where a state entity was a defendant and
144
forty-two cases where a state entity was a plaintiff. Of the fifty-eight
suits where a state entity was a defendant, thirty-two involved a state
145
institution of higher learning. In a related finding, the Software and
Information Industry Association (SIIA) claimed that, between 1995
and 2001, it handled seventy-seven “matters” involving a state entity;
146
about half of these involved a state institution of higher learning.
As market forces motivate state universities to compete for funds
to develop intellectual property, statutory and case law amplify the inequity of the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Eleventh
Amendment. Specifically, the fair use and research exemption doc147
trines are being winnowed away by Congress and the courts. For ex148
ample, the Digital Millennium Copyright Act proscribed nearly all
149
previously available fair use of digital information. In addition, the
150
recent Federal Circuit decision in Madey v. Duke University essentially
151
eviscerated any remnant of a research exemption for universities.

accusation of intellectual property infringement administratively” before the dispute
reaches the litigation stage. Id. at 12.
143
Id. at 2, 10 tbl.1.
144
Id. at 11.
145
Id. at 10 tbl.1.
146
Id. at 13. SIIA refers to these infringement cases as “matters” because they
rarely involve litigation; the state entity usually pays a penalty and complies with the law
once notified of its infringement. Id.
147
This Comment does not provide a thorough review of these doctrines and their
related case law. However, such an analysis may be found in Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property and the Digital Economy: Why the Anti-Circumvention Regulations Need To Be
Revised, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 519 (1999); Bentley J. Olive, Anti-Circumvention and
Copyright Management Information: Analysis of New Chapter 12 of the Copyright Act, 1 N.C.
J.L. & TECH. 19 (2000).
148
Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201–1205
(2000)).
149
See 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2000) (providing limited exemptions to fair use where an
entity circumvents technological measures controlling access to a protected work).
150
307 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 2639 (2003).
151
See James Boyle, Foreward: The Opposite of Property, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
Winter/Spring 2003, at 1, 27 (noting that the Federal Circuit has further limited the
already “crabbed U.S. research exemption” through its Madey ruling); Natalie M. Derzko, In Search of a Compromised Solution to the Problem Arising from Patenting Biomedical Research Tools, 20 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 347, 361 (2004) (asserting
that Madey and other recent developments in patent law have made the research exemption “essentially unavailable” to university researchers); Tom Saunders, Comment,
Renting Space on the Shoulders of Giants: Madey and the Future of the Experimental Use Doctrine, 113 YALE L.J. 261, 261 (2003) (stating that Madey “reformulated the experimental
use doctrine and cast considerable doubt on its continued viability as a defense in patent
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After Madey, no exemption will be recognized, even for noncommercial research, if it “further[s] the institution’s legitimate business ob152
jectives . . . .” Rather, the use must be “solely for amusement, to sat153
isfy idle curiosity, or for strictly philosophical inquiry . . . .”
The
impact of tightening the fair use and research exemption doctrines
may not yet be fully appreciated, but it will undoubtedly affect both
private and public universities. Fortunately for state universities, they
have a safety net in the Eleventh Amendment. Even if traditional fair
use and research exemptions do not protect the state universities, they
can rely on their sovereign immunity to limit their exposure to monetary damages for infringement.
The resulting combination of increased commercialization, frequent litigation, reduced fair use and research exemptions, and robust Eleventh Amendment immunity gives state universities a potentially strong financial advantage over their private counterparts.
Professor Mark Lemley best summarized the present situation’s inherent unfairness when he complained that the sovereign immunity doctrine as applied to intellectual property is “manifestly unfair because it
protects States from the rules of the market even when those States
154
participate in the market.” As he correctly emphasized, in the context of intellectual property infringement, state universities are not
behaving as sovereigns in the intellectual property market; they are
behaving as market participants who should be held to the same stan155
dards and rules as other similarly situated participants.
Many commentators have warned that the environment is ripe for
the wholesale infringement of intellectual property rights by state entities. The Register of Copyrights has said that “logic dictates that if a

infringement cases involving universities”). See generally David L. Parker, Patent Infringement Exemptions for Life Science Research, 16 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 615, 626-38 (1994)
(summarizing the history of the research exemption in the United States).
152
307 F.3d at 1362.
153
Id.
154
Hearing on State Sovereign Immunity, supra note 8, at 72 (statement by Mark A.
Lemley, Professor of Law, University of California at Berkeley) (explaining the unfairness of the current state sovereign immunity doctrine in the context of intellectual
property law).
155
Id. In College Savings Bank, interestingly, the Supreme Court rejected the state
agent’s reliance on the “market participant” cases, which the government used to argue that when states act as private market participants, they should be treated as any
other market participant. 527 U.S. 666, 684-85 (1999). In finding that the “market
participant” exception is not appropriate to a case of sovereign immunity, the Court
emphasized that, in such contexts, “‘[e]venhandness’ [sic] between individuals and
States is not to be expected . . . .” Id. at 685.
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segment of people will not be held fully accountable for certain ac156
tions, they may be less likely to restrict themselves in those actions.”
The National Association of College and University Attorneys concurs
in this prediction: “Given the dramatic reduction in the checks
against State infringement, it is only logical that the result will be in157
Even Professor Menell,
creased but unremedied infringements.”
who provides an exhaustive rebuttal to this position, concedes that as
universities are “drawn . . . into the commercial sphere, [it] inevitably
158
raises the potential for infringement of intellectual property rights.”
IV. PROPOSED ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS FOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
INFRINGEMENT BY STATE UNIVERSITIES
Even after the Supreme Court’s holdings in Florida Prepaid and
College Savings Bank, plaintiffs bringing intellectual property infringement suits against state entities still have limited remedies available,
though monetary relief is not one of them. In addition to these circumscribed remedies, Congress has considered several bills that abrogate and/or waive state sovereign immunity from monetary damages
in intellectual property infringement cases. The most recent attempt
has been led by Senator Leahy, who introduced the Intellectual Prop159
erty Protection Restoration Act of 2003 (S. 1191).
At present, remedies available to intellectual property holders include injunctive relief, state-defined relief for claims of inverse condemnation, tort, breach of license or contract, and state intellectual
160
property law.
Frequently, however, these remedies are less preferable than damage awards. For example, Professor Berman points out
that even when a state infringement appears to constitute a Fifth
156

Hearing on H.R. 2344, supra note 111, at 11.
Nat’l Ass’n of Coll. & Univ. Attorneys, supra note 20, at 1.
158
Menell, supra note 137, at 1433. Although not discussed in this Comment, increasing university participation in the commercial sphere may create an additional
area of concern; private entities, which would otherwise be subject to monetary damages for infringement, may seek to collaborate with state universities so that any intellectual property infringement committed by the collaborative entity would be shielded
from damage claims. Cf. supra text accompanying notes 113-16 (noting that the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory was immune from infringement-related damage
claims because it collaborated with a state university in its research).
159
S. 1191, 108th Cong. (2003).
160
See Malin, supra note 21, at 164-65 (providing a comprehensive list and discussion of post-Florida Prepaid state infringement remedies); Menell, supra note 137, at
1413-28 (discussing state causes of action available for intellectual property infringement). Relief under state intellectual property law is only available if the state provisions do not duplicate the federal intellectual property laws. Id. at 1422.
157
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Amendment taking justifying compensation, it is “far from clear at
the present time . . . how often and under what circumstances an act
162
of infringement will qualify as a taking.”
Because of this uncertainty, Senator Leahy has introduced S. 1191
in an attempt to close the perceived loophole in intellectual property
laws created by the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Eleventh
Amendment. This bill is not Senator Leahy’s first proposal to protect
intellectual property. In 1999, he introduced the Intellectual Property
163
Protection Restoration Act of 1999 (S. 1835). The key provision of
S. 1835 denied states and state instrumentalities the ability to acquire
federal intellectual property rights until they opted into the federal
164
Opting into that system required the
intellectual property system.
state to “waive sovereign immunity from suit in Federal court in any
action against the State or any instrumentality or official of that State,”
165
including state universities.
Although the bill was never passed, it received considerable atten166
tion from academics. In general, there was widespread recognition
that S. 1835’s reliance on state waiver of immunity, as opposed to
straight abrogation of such immunity by Congress, was a significant
167
advantage. Proponents of the bill argued that state waiver of immunity would be both superior to abrogation and more likely to survive
168
constitutional scrutiny by the courts, so long as the waiver was “vol169
untary and unequivocal” and involved a benefit that the state would
170
be “unable to realize . . . without Congress’s prior approval.”
S. 1835 did have some detractors. Professor Cross criticized the
171
bill and said that it would likely fail the germaneness standard. The
161

U.S. CONST. amend. V (providing that “private property shall not be taken for
public use, without just compensation”).
162
Berman et al., supra note 21, at 1072.
163
S. 1835, 106th Cong. (1999).
164
Id. § 111(a).
165
Id. § 111(b).
166
See, e.g., Berman et al., supra note 21; Cross, supra note 21; Malin, supra note 21.
167
See Berman et al., supra note 21, at 1130 (referring to the “obvious advantage”
of S. 1835 because the use of a waiver avoids any of the “complicated requirements for
abrogation” established by the Court); Bohannan, supra note 21, at 341 (presenting
several arguments for why federal and state governments should be permitted to “bargain over sovereign immunity”).
168
Bohannan, supra note 21, at 304.
169
Id.
170
Id. at 325.
171
Cross, supra note 21, at 385-86. Although a complete discussion of the germaneness doctrine is not provided in this Comment, additional explanation can be found in
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germaneness analysis seeks a connection between the condition im172
posed by the legislation and the expected benefit. In arguing that S.
1835 would fail a test for germaneness, Cross condemned the waiver
condition as not truly connected to the benefit of abrogating immunity because “[t]he condition that [S. 1835] would place on that benefit . . . applies not to the State’s own creative activity, but instead pro173
tects the creative activity of others.” Other scholars argued that the
bill would have a significant impact on nonconsenting states. For example, Steve Malin has suggested that it might be difficult for nonconsenting states to attract preeminent researchers to their state universities because such researchers would be unable to protect their
174
intellectual property. Professor Berman identified a separate weakness of S. 1835. He noted that the penalty imposed by the bill—denial
of any intellectual property rights protection—was “more severe than
necessary to equalize the positions of non-waiving states and their pri175
vate competitors.” An alternative, he suggested, would be “to grant
intellectual property protection even to non-waiving states, but to limit
their remedies to those that would be available in suits against
176
them.”
In 2003, Senator Leahy revised the proposed Intellectual Property
Protection Restoration Act and introduced a much more specific and
177
targeted proposal (S. 1191). An identical companion bill was introduced in the House of Representatives by Representatives Lamar Smith

David Cole, Beyond Unconstitutional Conditions: Charting Spheres of Neutrality in Government-Funded Speech, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 675 (1992); Brooks R. Fudenberg, Unconstitutional
Conditions and Greater Powers: A Separability Approach, 43 UCLA L. REV. 371 (1995); Albert J. Rosenthal, Conditional Federal Spending and the Constitution, 39 STAN. L. REV. 1103
(1987); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1415
(1989); and Cass R. Sunstein, Why the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine is an Anachronism (With Particular Reference to Religion, Speech, and Abortion), 70 B.U. L. REV. 593 (1990).
172
Cross, supra note 21, at 385. Cross believes the germaneness analysis is relevant
whenever Congress seeks to bestow a benefit. Id. at 386.
173
Id. at 385-86.
174
Malin, supra note 21, at 189.
175
Berman et al., supra note 21, at 1160.
176
Id.
177
See 149 CONG. REC. S7479-80 (daily ed. Jun. 5, 2003) (statement of Sen. Leahy)
(introducing S. 1191 and describing it as a refinement of the bill’s predecessor, S.
1835). Between S. 1835 in 1999 and S. 1191 in 2003, Senator Leahy introduced two
other bills seeking to protect intellectual property. Intellectual Property Protection
Restoration Act of 2002, S. 2031, 107th Cong. (2002); Intellectual Property Protection
Restoration Act of 2001, S. 1611, 107th Cong. (2001). S. 1611 was identical to S. 2031,
with the exception that the latter was cosponsored by Sen. Sam Brownback in 2002. S.
2031 was identical in substance to S. 1911.
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and Howard Berman (H.R. 2344).
These bills have four purposes:
(1) to “eliminate the unfair commercial advantage that States and
their instrumentalities now hold,” (2) to “promote technological innovation and artistic creation,” (3) to “reaffirm the availability of prospective relief against State officials,” and (4) to “abrogate State sovereign immunity in cases where States or their instrumentalities,
officers, or employees violate the United States Constitution by in179
Senator Leahy has stated
fringing Federal intellectual property.”
that he considers it intolerable that “some participants in the intellectual property system get legal protection but need not adhere to the
law themselves,” arguing that a change in the status quo must be made
180
if fairness is truly valued.
S. 1191 has three core provisions that are noticeably different than
its 1999 predecessor bill. The first provision precludes monetary relief
for a state or state entity for infringement of its intellectual property
181
unless the state has waived its immunity. Accordingly, a non-waiving
state is limited to the same remedies afforded to individual plaintiffs
whose intellectual property is infringed by the state. The second provision of S. 1191 clarifies the remedies available for statutory violations
by a state officer or employee; it provides that “remedies shall be
available against the [state] officer or employee in the same manner
and to the same extent as such remedies are available in an action
182
against private individuals under like circumstances.” The final provision of the bill allows actual damages from any state for due process
183
or takings violations involving intellectual property.
Senator Leahy is optimistic that his bill is both attractive to states
and constitutional under current Supreme Court jurisprudence. He
reasons that his bill offers options to states: “It creates reasonable incentives for States to waive their immunity in intellectual property
184
cases, but it does not oblige them to do so.” He argues that this revised bill is constitutional because “Congress may attach conditions to
178

Intellectual Property Protection Restoration Act of 2003, H.R. 2344, 108th
Cong. (2003).
179
S. 1191 § 2; H.R. 2344 § 2.
180
149 CONG. REC. S7479, S7479-80 (daily ed. Jun. 5, 2003) (statement of Sen.
Leahy).
181
See S. 1191 § 3 (amending laws covering patents, copyrights, and trademarks to
require a waiver of state sovereign immunity prior to allowing damages for infringement).
182
Id. § 4.
183
Id. § 5.
184
149 CONG. REC. S7480 (statement of Sen. Leahy).
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a State’s receipt of Federal intellectual property protection under its
Article I property power just as Congress may attach conditions on a
185
State’s receipt of federal funds under its Article I spending power.”
Since the bill is still being vetted by politicians and interested parties,
it is too early to know whether either of Senator Leahy’s contentions
will hold true.
What is clear is that both supporters and opponents of S. 1191 appear to be retrenching for a contentious mêlée. Supporters of the bill
include the Copyright Office, the American Bar Association, the
American Intellectual Property Law Association, the Business Software
Alliance, the Intellectual Property Owners Association, the International Trademark Association, the Motion Picture Association of
America, the Professional Photographers of America Association, and
186
the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. These organizations consider the
187
bill “carefully balanced” and an example of “legislation that would
as a matter of fairness and in the interest of consumer protection hold
states and state entities to the same principles of law as the private sec188
In addition, it is likely that the bill has two strong advocates
tor.”
representing academic interests: the American Association of University Professors (AAUP) and the National Association of College and
University Attorneys (NACUA). Both organizations have voiced support for liability for state university infringement on private intellectual property holders’ rights. In its June 2002 position paper on intellectual property, the AAUP states that, contrary to the administration
of many universities, it supports “this basic restoration of a level play189
ing field to intellectual property law.” The NACUA echoes this sentiment by claiming that Leahy’s bill will help to “restore the balance of
185

Id. (statement of Sen. Leahy); see also U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 8 (granting
Congress the power “to promote the progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing
for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries”).
186
149 CONG. REC. S7480 (statement of Sen. Leahy) (mentioning that these organizations publicly support his bill).
187
Hearing on H.R. 2344, supra note 111, at 6 (statement of Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights, U.S. Copyright Office) (describing the Copyright Office’s support of
the Intellectual Property Protection Restoration Act H.R. 2344).
188
Letter from Kathryn Barrett Park, President, International Trademark Association, to Lamar Smith, Chairman, House Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet and Intellectual Prop., Committee on the Judiciary ( June 13, 2003), available at http://www.
inta.org/policy/test_abrogation.html.
189
Am. Ass’n of Univ. Professors, Intellectual Property: An AAUP Position Paper, at
http://www.aaup.org/govrel/capthill/2002/02ip.htm ( June 2002). The AAUP’s paper deals with S. 2031, which is identical to S. 1191 in virtually all aspects. Supra note
178.
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intellectual property protection and level the playing field by encour190
aging States to waive their sovereign immunity.”
Just as the Supreme Court seems unimpressed with “abstract con191
cerns such as fairness” when it comes to sovereign immunity, opponents of S. 1191 (and its predecessors) dispute the “level playing field”
argument. Leading the charge against the bill are the Association of
192
University Technology Managers, the National Association of State
193
Universities and Land-Grant Colleges, and the American Council
194
on Education.
These opponents share a common concern that, as
state entities, the bill will subject them to liability for actual damages,
but, because they lack the persuasive power necessary to convince
their state to waive immunity to suit, they will be precluded from receiving damages for infringement on their own intellectual property.

190

Nat’l Ass’n of Coll. & Univ. Attorneys, supra note 20, at 1.
See Bohannan, supra note 21, at 302 (“Given the Court’s recent abrogation decisions . . . it may seem unrealistic to suggest that abstract concerns such as fairness or
the rule of law will trump the Court’s calculus of sovereign immunity in evaluating
waivers.”).
192
See Letter from Janet E. Scholz, President, Association of University Technology
Managers, Inc., to Patrick J. Leahy, Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary, United
States Senate, and Orrin G. Hatch, Ranking Member, Committee on the Judiciary,
United States Senate (May 16, 2002), available at www.autm.net/announcements/
s2031letter.pdf (noting the Association’s “strong opposition to” S. 2031, which is identical to S. 1911 and H.R. 2344, for being “internally inconsistent” by attempting to
promote innovation while also barring state entities from obtaining intellectual property rights without waiver). Neither S. 1191 nor its predecessor, S. 2031, however, limits the availability of intellectual property protection for state entities. Rather, these
bills limit the ability of a state entity to collect monetary damages. Supra note 181 and
accompanying text. Thus, it appears that the Association of University Technology
Managers is reacting to S. 1835, not the revised 2002 or 2003 version of that bill. See
Intellectual Property Protection Restoration Act of 1999, S. 1835, § 111, 106th Cong.
(1999) (“No State or any instrumentality of that State may acquire a Federal intellectual property right unless that State opts into the Federal intellectual property system.”).
193
See Letter from C. Peter Magrath, President, National Association of State Universities and Land-Grant Colleges, to Patrick J. Leahy, Chairman, Committee on the
Judiciary, United States Senate 1 (Apr. 17, 2002), available at http://www.nasulgc.
org/Washington_Watch/Letters2002/S2031_state_sovereign_immunity.pdf (opposing
S. 2031 and requesting a delay in the legislative process so that it can help redraft the
legislation).
194
See Richard Morgan, Colleges Step Up Lobbying Against Proposed Intellectual-Property
Legislation, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Apr. 23, 2002) (stating that Sheldon E. Steinbach,
the Vice President and General Counsel of the American Council on Education, “said
that the bill’s [S. 2031] current language would put colleges in a ‘diminished’ and
‘compromised’ position as owners of intellectual property”), at http://chronicle.com/
prm/daily/2002/04/2002042301n.htm.
191
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195

Accordingly, they believe they will be unduly punished.
For such
opponents, a preferred version of this bill would allow a state to make
a piecemeal waiver of its immunity (e.g., waive the immunity for cer196
tain entities).
V. THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION RESTORATION ACT
OF 2003: THE OPTIMAL SOLUTION
The current version of the Intellectual Property Protection Restoration Act, S. 1191, is the optimal solution to the problems of the intellectual property regime created by Florida Prepaid and College Savings
Bank. The bill should be passed by Congress and supported by state
universities.
Congress should adopt S. 1191 as introduced in June 2003 by
Senator Leahy and Representatives Berman and Smith for three reasons. First, the bill successfully avoids the straight abrogation approach, and the attendant constitutional problems, that were ridiculed in Florida Prepaid. Leahy’s bill gives states a choice: They can
either waive their Eleventh Amendment immunity or forego monetary
197
damages in their own suits against intellectual property infringers.
The bill is thus unambiguous, completely voluntary, and concerns a
benefit—monetary relief for intellectual property suits—that only the
federal government can grant. Under this bill, each state can calculate the relative costs and benefits of waving its sovereign immunity.
The bill’s emphasis on remedies, rather than intellectual property
rights more broadly, overcomes the constitutional objections of Malin

195

See Letter from Janet E. Scholz to Patrick J. Leahy and Orrin J. Hatch, supra
note 192, at 2 (arguing that there is no reason to believe that a state would waive its
immunity to appease a university technology transfer office); Letter from C. Peter Magrath to Patrick J. Leahy, supra note 193, at 1 (claiming that it is “highly unlikely that
[public universities] can convince state legislatures to waive immunity for all state entities”); Email from Mani Iyer, Director, Office of Intellectual Property, Louisiana State
University, to Techno-L@lists.uventures.com (Mar. 21, 2002, 12:03PM CST) (maintaining that the bill, if passed, “would put state universities in the untenable position of
trying to persuade their respective legislatures to allow such suits against the entire
state government . . . when universities are usually the only state agencies that directly
benefit from technology transfer efforts”), available at http://lists.essential.org/
pipermail/ip-health/2002-April/002861.html.
196
But see Nat’l Ass’n of Coll. & Univ. Attorneys, supra note 20 (criticizing the “entity-by-entity approach” to immunity waiver as “encourag[ing] gamesmanship by a State
that could arrange for all the State’s intellectual property rights to be owned by particular entities”).
197
Intellectual Property Protection Restoration Act, S. 1191, §§ 3-4, 108th Cong.
(2003); see also supra text accompanying notes 181-82 (describing the effect of S. 1835).
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and Professors Cross and Berman. There is a strong showing of germaneness between the waiver and the goal as the state’s waiver of sovereign immunity triggers the possible benefit of being allowed to seek
monetary relief in its own infringement suits. In addition, both the
waiver and the benefit are well-aligned with Congress’s goal of equalizing the relief available to state and private plaintiffs in intellectual
property disputes. Finally, the bill does not overly penalize nonwaiving states or their entities. Under the bill, nonwaiving states may still
obtain intellectual property rights and protection; they simply will be
foreclosed from seeking monetary damages.
Second, the bill injects a shot of fairness into the intellectual
property system that is otherwise subject to abuse by states and their
entities. Given the increasing commercialization of state universities,
the subsequent litigation activity between state universities and private
parties, and the narrowing of available fair use and research exemption provisions, proactive legislation is needed to ensure that state entities do not unfairly take advantage of sovereign immunity to the detriment of other intellectual property holders. An imbalanced system
will create disincentives to innovate for persons like Mark Andelman,
will lead to strategic behavior by private parties dealing with state entities, and may encourage further judicial activism, resulting in inconsistent interpretations of the law regarding sovereign immunity. Fairness and equity in intellectual property do matter, and Congress
should consider them.
Third, Congress should adopt this bill because of its timeliness.
As several commentators have warned, there is a clear danger that
states may increase their infringement upon privately held intellectual
property rights because of the affirmation of their immunity from
monetary damages in infringement suits. S. 1191 provides a timely
stopgap measure to limit state infringement. Adoption of S. 1191
would also give Congress additional time to analyze the scope and
trend of intellectual property infringement by states. Should the bill’s
provisions prove insufficient to curb state infringement, then a more
thorough analysis conducted while S. 1191 is in effect may provide sufficient justification for outright congressional abrogation of state immunity.
While these three justifications should persuade Congress to pass
S. 1191 into law, there is, of course, the obvious concern that the incentive of monetary relief may not be sufficient to persuade some
states to waive their immunity. It is possible that a state may decide to
forego the benefits of monetary relief for the assurances of immunity
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from such claims. For this reason, it is critically important that state
universities support the bill and encourage their legislatures to voluntarily waive their immunity.
State universities have four incentives to support S. 1191. First,
and fundamentally, the proposal places no additional burdens on
technology transfer offices or the researchers and creators at universities. The bill simply ensures a neutral environment for bargaining
and innovating. Second, as passed, the bill will give teeth to existing
university policies that prohibit infringement of private intellectual
198
Without this bill, there is very little to prevent a
property rights.
state university researcher, instructor, or creator from infringing another person’s intellectual property right. Third, unlike a piecemeal
approach to waiver, a complete and broad waiver by a state of sovereign immunity from intellectual property suits will ensure a manageable and consistent environment regarding immunity. As the GAO
found when analyzing the number of infringement suits involving
state entities, knowing when an entity is eligible for sovereign immu199
nity and when it is not can be a thorny endeavor. By making all entities—whether privately or publicly funded—subject to liability for
monetary damages in intellectual property infringement suits, the bill
provides certainty to intellectual property holders that their rights will
be fully protected. The fourth and final reason that state universities
should support S. 1191 is the opportunity it gives them to demonstrate
their influence on their state legislators. Across the board, intellectual
200
property holders have tremendous political power. Given their impressive intellectual property holdings, it is quite conceivable that
state universities would have an equally tremendous impact; any argument to the contrary undermines the inherent influence that state
201
universities possess. Ultimately, the support by state universities for
198

See, e.g., UNIV. OF TEX. SYS., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY POLICY & GUIDELINES
(rev. ed. 1999), available at http://www.utsystem.edu/ogc/IntellectualProperty/
polguide.htm (establishing guidelines for creating and using intellectual property);
UNIV. OF CAL., UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA POLICY ON THE REPRODUCTION OF
COPYRIGHTED MATERIALS FOR TEACHING AND RESEARCH (1986), available at http://
www.ucop.edu/ucophome/coordrev/policy/4-29-86.html#guide (providing “direction
on photocopying of copyrighted materials for teaching and research”).
199
Supra note 142.
200
See Menell, supra note 137, at 1438 (asserting that, “[a]s a class, intellectual
property owners have tremendous political clout”).
201
Such influence is realized in several ways. For example, the fact that congressional appropriations exceeding $2 billion in fiscal year 2003 is persuasive evidence
that state universities have significant political clout. These federally funded academic
earmarks represent a ten percent increase over previous year’s appropriations, suggesting
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S. 1191 will ensure that states do not choose to sidestep this fair and
needed legislation.
CONCLUSION
At a time when state universities are becoming increasingly commercialized, immunity from monetary damages is no longer appropriate. By collaborating with private entities, reaping millions of dollars
in licensing revenue, and seeking monetary relief for infringement by
private parties, state universities have demonstrated their desire and
ability to operate similarly to private entities. Consequently, it seems
unconscionable that state universities should be allowed to hide from
monetary damages in infringement suits.
Nevertheless, so long as state universities are allowed to invoke
Eleventh Amendment immunity to deflect monetary damages in infringement suits, there will be an injustice to both private universities
and to intellectual property holders whose rights are infringed by state
universities. Private universities are disadvantaged because, unlike
state universities, monetary damage awards threaten their financial interests, a threat amplified by recent narrowing of the fair use and research exemption doctrines. Intellectual property holders are likewise
disadvantaged because they lack access to monetary relief when state
universities infringe their patents, copyrights, or trademarks.
This cabining of monetary relief is not only inequitable, it has created several additional negative consequences, including frustration
and resentment among entities that remain subject to monetary
damages, disincentives to innovate, strategic behavior by intellectual

that state universities have been increasingly successful in their lobbying efforts of
Congress. For further discussion, see Jeffrey Brainard & Anne Marie Borrego, Academic
Pork Barrel Tops $2-Billion for the First Time, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Sept. 26, 2003, at
A18.
Additionally, studies such as the one conducted by the Huron Consulting Group
for North Carolina’s public universities, detail state universities’ impact on the overall
economy of a state. See HURON CONSULTING GROUP, ENHANCING THE ABILITY OF
NORTH CAROLINA’S PUBLIC RESEARCH UNIVERSITIES TO CONTRIBUTE TO STATE
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (2004), available at http://www.unc.edu/news/newsserv/
archives/mar04/ncstate/huronreport.doc. In that study, Huron concluded that the
State of North Carolina benefited by as much as $930 million from the “transformation
of Federal funds [received by state universities] into revenue for local residents and
North Carolina businesses.” Id. at 8-9. North Carolina also enjoyed stable employment
rates and attracted new businesses, some of which developed new technologies, because of the state universities. Id. at 9-10. As the Huron study demonstrates, public
universities have considerable economic impact on states; thus, it follows that they
command some influence with state and federal legislatures.
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property holders dealing with state entities, and judicial activism. Left
unchanged, some scholars warn that state entities may actually infringe intellectual property with greater frequency since there is no
financial deterrent preventing them from so doing. Indeed, given the
financial value of intellectual property licensing by universities, it is
easy to appreciate a state university’s potential incentives to infringe
when pursuing a new technology or innovation.
To redress this unfairness, Congress should enact the Intellectual
Property Protection Restoration Act of 2003. Unlike earlier proposals,
S. 1191 gives states the choice to either waive their immunity in intellectual property suits or risk being denied monetary relief for infringement of their own state-owned intellectual property. In this way,
S. 1191 avoids the obstacle of immunity abrogation, and instead, permits each state to determine whether the benefit of waiving immunity
is balanced by the potential cost of monetary damages.
The Intellectual Property Protection Restoration Act of 2003 is vitally necessary in this era of state university commercialization. Such
legislation will help redistribute the risk of infringement back on state
entities, thereby ensuring that all infringers—whether public or private—are subject to a level playing field for intellectual property
rights.

